The literature on leasing has generally concentrated on providing manage? ment with a selection criterion for the lease-versus-purchase decision; over the years, a variety of recommendations have been advanced ( [1] , [3] , [6] , [8] , [16] , and [18] ). More recent papers, however, have shown that the terms of leasing contracts in a transaction-costless competitive capital market will inevitably be such as to render the stockholders of value-maximizing firms indifferent to that decision ( [11] and [12] ). Simply put, competition among potential lessors?
together with the mandates of securities-price-equilibrating trading activities of investors in lessee and lessor firms?will necessarily drive the present values of the cash flows associated with lease arrangements to parity with direct asset purchase prices.
This conclusion has been seen to hold even in the presence of corporate leverage and income taxes ( [11] and [12] ) as long as the tax rates and asset depreciation possibilities of lessee and lessor firms are identical. The key to the latter result is a recognition of the fact that the borrowing power?
and attendant tax savings?implicitly relinquished by the lessee firm, when lease obligations are assumed, is just matched by the augmented borrowing power simultaneously created for the lessor enterprise.
In a competitive leasing market, these savings will be passed through to the asset-user firm in the form of lower lease payments, with the result that the present value of the contrac?
tual obligations again will equal the asset's (tax-adjusted) purchase price. porate tax law, to take advantage of tax shields [14] . site side of the transaction, of course, the lessor firm cannot afford to pay more than V without subjecting its securityholders to a reduction in wealth. L Accordingly, its decision rule will be that A ? V , and thereby only one execu-L tion price, A = V , can satisfy both parties simultaneously. In a competitive L capital market comprised of value-maximizing enterprises, sale-and-leaseback terms will be driven to this point, and in equilibrium the aggregate wealth of the lessee firm's stockholders and bondholders will be unchanged by the saleand-leaseback agreement.
both the second-hand asset and secondary leasing markets, and any distinctive supplementary provisions?perhaps including renewal options?which are attached to the lease contract.
A similar conclusion for new-asset leases is documented in detail in [11] .
III.
Allocation of the Valuation Effects
Within that aggregate, however, there can be a reallocation of values. In Thus, shareholders stand to gain from the transaction whenever?and precisely to the extent that?bondholders suffer a diminution in the market value of their holdings.
As it happens, the market value of the bonds involved can only decline as a result of the sale-and-leaseback, as long as there is a finite probability of lessee-firm bankruptcy.
The reason is that the sale-and-leaseback diverts to the lessor a priority claim to a segment of the cash flow prospects which originally belonged to bondholders. Because of this restructuring of claims, there are no circumstances in which the cash flows to bondholders can be greater after the transaction than before, and there will be some circumstances?notably bank?
ruptcy?in which those flows will be smaller. Inevitably, then, B' will be less than B, due to market reaction to the altered bondholder position.
4 While equation (6) is perhaps most easily interpreted when the asset-sale proceeds are disbursed to stockholders in the form of a cash dividend payment, it obviously applies as well to the situation of share repurchase. In the latter case, the per-share price implications can also be identified. Thus, if the lessee firir initially has N common shares outstanding at a market price P per share, the number which can be retired with the sale proceeds A will be AN=A/P', where P' is the revised per-share price which will be attained as soon as the sale-and-leaseback and repurchase plans are announced by the firm. Hence, shareholder wealth can be expressed as S? + A = P'(N-AN) + A = NP? .
Substituting into (6) and rearranging yields pt -p = (B -B')/N indicating that the market price of the shares will increase, remain constant, or decrease depending upon whether the market price of the lessee firm's bonds decreases, remains constant, or increases.
This 
and this distribution is strictly inferior to that of (7). That is, subtract?
ing (8) from (7), we find that An analogous interpretation of the prerogatives of equity ownership is contained in [2] .
Thus, any lease commitments will imply a reduction in subsequent debt capacity for the lessee, given an unchanged production and investment plan for the firm, and thereby a sacrifice of the valuation benefits which?according to all re? ceived doctrine ( [5] , [7] , and [13] )?will attend leverage in an environment where interest payments are tax-deductible.
On the other hand, this sacrifice is offset by a precisely equivalent enhancement of borrowing power for the lessor, since that enterprise is the recipient of the same set of fixed-charge promises, emanating from the same set of unchanged lessee-firm operating cash flows. In a competitive capital market free of transaction costs, lenders will thereupon be encouraged to accommodate the lessor with higher loans to the same degree that they are led to refrain from accommodating the lessee. Consequently, the relevant leverage (tax) bene?
fits will be transferred intact to the lessor, enabling that firm to reduce 6 its quoted sale-and-leaseback terms.
If competition among lessors is strenuous, then, the reduction will reach the point where it exactly compensates the lessee firm for the leverage valuation penalty the latter incurs. Indeed, un?
less it does, the securityholders of the lessee will suffer from the transac?
tion?and its management will not accede to the terms [11] . niques of dynamic programming. Solutions to the analogous problem of optimal bond refunding timing have been formulated by Elton and Gruber [4] , Kraus [10] , and Pye [15] .
